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Recent developments in biotechnology require reldefinition of human "being." In this
paper, the author suggest that the term "human being " is substituted with "human between-
ness. " This substitution emergesfrom a philosophical/theological reading ofbiological texts,
such as those by E. O. Wilson, Ernst Mayr, Richard Lewontin, and David Slan Wilson. Tlie
betweenness is possible only by the bodily integration (i.e., inclusive fitness or causal effi-
cacy). Yet the need of the integration already presumes the complexity and overlap of the
betweennesses (reciprical altruism orpresentational immediacy). The Confucian understand-
ing ofmorality as the integration o/Tao ( ££ ^^^ Way) andTe (i*. Virtue) shows the possibility
of seeing human "being" as human "betweenness, "—that is, human "being" as the actual-
ization ofplural li f f^ ) in the bodiliness ( ^ ).
Introductory Reflection
My experiences of the xenotransplanta-
tion lab placement seminar and the "religion-
and-science" class have offered me a new per-
spective to see the world differently than be-
fore. The experience of the xenotransplanta-
tion lab brought me a moral/ethical confusion
from the lack of moral/ethical criteria for di-
rectly judging bioethical dilemmas and prob-
lems. The class in religion and science has
offered me how the current science, that is,
biology, has explored human morality and its
social nature. Together, the class and the lab
placement have led me to think about human
moral sense and about how religion and phi-
losophy explain it. Although looking at cog-
nitive science and bioethics have really been
helpful for me, I do not mention them because
they lie outside the scope of this paper.
Xenotransplantion shows a vision of a
human beings hybridized with cells or organs
derived from pigs. It is a vision in which the
human being seems to become an immortal
being, who would be able to extend life until
she or he wants to die, by continuously re-
placing old and worn-out cells and organs with
new ones. It would be the fulfillment of the
longest-held wish of himian beings: to be
immortal or to be divine, by manipulating the
natural processes of life. At first, it seeined
so. at least to me. In other words, xenotrans-
plantation seems just to repeat the myth of
human beings as "the masters of all creation."
when our global community does not have a
"reverence for all life."
'
In fact, there have also been some nega-
tive perspectives of xenotransplantation. Ac-
cording to those perspectives, in short, xeno-
transplantation is the violation of "a line that
should not be crossed" because it will just
intensify a desire to increase financial inter-
est.' In other words, commercial cross-spe-
cies transplantation, including xenotransplan-
tation, would just lure into "huge financial in-
centives for biotechnology and pharmaceuti-
cal companies." ^ The cost of xenotransplan-
tation is expected to outweigh the benefit it
promises to offer ($250,000 per operation in
1995)." In this sense, xenotransplantation is
just for the chosen.^
Further, there is no evidence that research-
ers have overcome the infection problems
derived from xenosis. There are ample evi-
dences in the history of medicine that the
crossing over of species boundaries can cause
fatal medical disasters.^ In the case of xeno-
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transplantation, there are currently no ways
"to screen for all aniinal-specific diseases" and
to avoid "a lethal unknown virus" that can
escape our vaccination and testing programs7
Worse, no way to predict the possible results
from xenotransplantation with regard to its
long-term negative effects. Further, accord-
ing to the report of the Institute of Medicine
in June 1996, it is not possible to
biotechnologically produce "germ-free" (or
pathogen-free) animals.^
Moreover, even if researchers can orga-
nize a regulatory system to monitor the re-
cipients of xenotransplantation and his/her
family and intimates and to prevent the spread
of unknown disease, there is no guarantee for
it because "weak regulatory oversight, and
human error and negligence" cannot be com-
pletely eliininated.^ Given oiu- society's poor
ability to manage "the consequences of mod-
em science and technology, including the in-
creasing lethality of military weapons, envi-
roimiental pollution, rainforest destruction,
exponential population growth, and AIDS,"
we cannot honestly but ask ourselves
"whether we have the wisdom and moral
matiuity needed to deal with the consequences
of xenotransplantation and related genetic
technologies." '°
Selfish motives cannotforever be elimi-
natedfrom human nature; but, according
to this multilevel selection theory, humans
can increase altruistic motives voluntarily,
so as to increase the fitness ofthe group.
Macroscopically, the above problems are
not confined to xenotransplantation. Rather,
any human development of sciece and tech-
nology more or less accompany some of them.
All human activities including xenotransplan-
tation have caused probably by our inborn
biological drives. In this sense, science and
technology can be seen as the expression of
our deliberate action (^^ yii-wei). The
deliberate action ( ^^ yu-wei) includes the
re-fonnation of our naturality artificially."
That is, our deliberate action ( ^^ yu-wei)
as well as the action of non-action ( pte^ wu-
wei) also belong to our naturalness of life. In
this sense, we cannot simply reject the bio-
technology. If it is worth enough to improve
our life situation, we need to think positively
about it.'- For example, the treatment of
Parkinson's Disease by xenotransplant tech-
nology would contribute to the well-being of
the global community. No disease is an indi-
vidual matter. In a family, when one member
gets sick, it at least influences everyone else
in the family. In this sense, the benefit of treat-
ing a disease is communal.
The real problem is the fact that himian
beings are not good enough to build a relevant
moral virtue for handling the emerging prob-
lems from the new scientific/medical tech-
nologies. Moreover, they do not have any ob-
jective criterion to evaluate the virtue of each
person. Although the concept of virtue can
offer an orientation towards a solution, it does
not offer any details. In this context, religios-
ity needs to have a more practical perspective
toward problematic situations. This is the real
problem I see when I look at the matter of
xenotransplantation. Can a relevant moral
framework be built in
order to discuss human
actions (^;@ yu-wei)
and wisdom (ft^ wu-
wei). Again, the current
problem seems to lie in
a "lack of a moral frame-
work" to "form moral in-
tegrity." '^ Although the
B above negativejudgment
" on xenotransplantation,
on the one hand, and science and technology
in general, on the other hand, raises many
questions, all the questions seem to suiiuna-
rize in the following two questions: Who are
we? and what is the limit of human activity
(manipulation)? These are the questions of
the moral integration. These are what reli-
gions have tried to answer throughout their
histories. Traditionally, the religious forms
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of the two questions are: Why is there some-
tliing rather than nothing? and. Is everything
possible if God does not exist? Can the pos-
sible religious answers to these questions
bring us a practical ethical option to solve the
current moral dilemma caused by the rapid
development of sciences and biotechnologies?
These days, some biologists seem to an-
swer these questions."* However, their an-
swers seem to be very antagonistic to religion
and philosophy. Moreover, their definition
of religion seems to be very strange to me.
For instance, the conservative and narrow
spirituality of the Southern Baptists, against
which E. O. Wilson himself stands, is a very
tiny part of all the religions in the world. Fur-
thermore, their answers do not seem to say
anything new, because the biologists' discov-
eries about morality are things that many of
world's religions have always emphasized.
However, it does not mean that religion gives
any clear answer to the problems or that sci-
ence cannot produce a solution. Rather, a way
of consilience across the boundary between
science and religion needs to be found. From
a unified wisdom in human activities, some
practical options for the futile can be devised.
Nevertheless, we theologians need to keep
in mind that, when religions lose a flexibility
to see actual situations, they are going to face
a threat of disappearing. This is the futuric
vision Wilsonian sociobiology offers,'^ and
theologian Willem Drees recommends that re-
ligions—including theologians and philoso-
phers—take science seriously.'^
Biological Explanation of Morality
Biologist Ernst Mayr tries to distinguish
the ultimate causation from the proximate
causation in explaining morality and ethics.'^
His explanation of morality and ethics is based
on the distinction between inclusive fitness
altruism and reciprocal altruism}^ Mayr's ex-
planation offers a chance to distinguish mo-
rality from ethics on the basis of the distinc-
tion between inclusive fitness and reciprocal
altruism. By doing so, Mayr tries to avoid a
kind of biological reductionism, a biology-
based systematic analysis of social and cul-
tiu-al phenomena. Mayr's understanding of
the origin of human ethics emphasizes the
importance of learning. That is, inclusive fit-
ness is a small part in human ethics. Rather,
the inborn tendency should be developed by
learning. Thus, the role of culture is empha-
sized more than inborn genetic mechanism,
although the latter is the basis of the former.
By contrast, Wilson's concern''^ lies in
making a tight junction between genes and
cultures, thus making biology predictive sci-
ence. For Wilson, sociobiology is "the sys-
tematic study of the biological basis of all
social behavior." ^° This has led other scien-
tists and humanists to see Wilson's sociobiol-
ogy as a program of strongly reducing all so-
cial behaviors, including cultures, to biologi-
cal or genetic mechanisms. In fact, Wilson's
methodological reductionism is to make sci-
ence predictive, because, for Wilson, the value
or meaning of science lies in its "predictive
power," not in its "true description." -' Thus,
by understanding the biology of human inbom
genetic mechanism, the future can be influ-
enced on the basis of scientific prediction
about the workings of the genetic mechanism.
That is, the understanding of the inbom (ge-
netic) tendency for inclusive fitness should be
more emphasized; the understanding of inclu-
sive fitness is prior to learning and should be
the basis of learning, because learning is car-
ried out on the basis of the predictability of
inbom tendencies for inclusive fitness.
However, for Lewontin, "God is in de-
tails, that is, good science is based on care-
fully established facts, not on ambitious mod-
els." " For Lewontin, there is no way to make
any science predictive.^ It would end in mak-
ing scientific theories into mixtures with so-
cial and political ideologies. Rather, focus-
ing the facts known thus far, we should try to
ease the difficulties of contemporary life situ-
ations, such as overwork and low wages, ac-
cording to whatever we perceive of as envi-
ronment. For Lewontin, the role of science
is to describe accurately the real world with
its complexity and multilayeredness. The live
complexity of reality should not be reduced
in order to make a theory that describes it.
Any theory that disregards the complex as-
pects of reality is "bad science." ^^ Thus, for
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Lewontin. the Wilsonian project of sociobi-
ology belongs to the category of bad science.
in that it seeks the predictability of human
social behaviors.
For the multilevel selectionists. Elliott
Sober and David Slan Wilson.-^ the basic
mechanism of altruism is inclusive fitness.
Reciprocal altruism may be a secondary
mechanism. To increase the fitness of group,
the secondary mechanism intensifies the al-
truistic motives and behaviors in the primary
genetic mechanism of an individual in the
group. In this process, there are no singular,
but only plural, motives in human moral be-
havior. Selfish motives caimot forever be
eliminated from human nature; but. accord-
ing to this multilevel selection theory, humans
can increase altruistic motives voluntarily, so
as to increase the fitness of the group, the in-
flated self that sets up a boundary between
the Other (identified with "my" -self) and the
other (abjected as "someone-else-self).
Moreover, this group selection process can
take place both on the genetic and cultural
levels. Although this multilevel selection
theory does not show the tight connection
between genes and culture, the secondary
mechanism can increase the frequency of al-
truistic behavior by complementing the pri-
mary biological mechanism through social
structures, laws, moral imperatives, and so on.
Thus, this multilevel selection theory shows
a rough picture of the interaction between
genes and cultures; and, in my view, this pic-
ture is very much closer to the Wilsonian
project than to Mayr and to Lewontin, in that
genes and culture are really interconnected
with each other.
All of the biological theories exclude any
religious and philosophical explanation from
their understanding of morality and ethic. All
of them think that no religious explanation is
any longer needed to explain the meaning of
life and the justification for morality. For
theologians and philosophers or humanists,
these arguments sound very strange, because
what the biologists think of as religion seems
to be incredibly narrow, and also because what
the biologists have discovered as "new" about
morality and meaning of life does not seem
to be anything new. Biological theories do
not take theology and religion (and philoso-
phy) seriously enough.
Nevertheless, the scientific explanations
of morality are sufficiently clear to allow a
rough picture to be drawn about interconnec-
tions between genes and culture, and the re-
lation between body and mind. This picture
seems to offer a starting point for the integra-
tion of religion and science. In Whitehead,
this interconnection between genes and cul-
ture, between body and mind, is expressed as
"causal efficacy"; and in Confucian thought,
it is expressed as the unification of body and
mind through moral self-cultivation. The
causal efficacy matches with the interconnec-
tion of genes and culture, and moral self-cul-
tivation seems to be a religious contrast to vo-
litional evolution, especially in E. O. Wilson's
thought.
Philosophical and Religious Expla-
nations of Morality in Terms of
Human Bodiliness and Betweenness
All these biological explanations are cen-
tering on the "causal efficacy" or "human
bodiliness" of morality. We humans are bio-
logical beings. Our cultural architectures may
be historical extensions of our biological
mechanism.
None of the above biological explanations
of morality allows theology or philosophy to
offer wisdom for the future of human beings.
For example. Wilson has a certain moral aim
that is "a quantitative explanation of all as-
pects of human social behavior [to be] able
to formulate a trajectory of mankind's future
(as a substitute for divine prophecy)."^ Thus,
his moral task is to exclude "the divine spirit
and other extraneous agents" from the expla-
nation of human nature and also to explain
divine revelation in terms of the "quantita-
tive explanation," because Wilson thinks that
both theology and Western philosophy are
currently unable to offer the needed wisdom
for the future of humankind.-^ By doing so,
Wilson puts science at a position of impor-
tance higher than the humanities and social
sciences, exaggerating that only science "pre-
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scribes the correct values for us." ^ Mayr
shares, at least in part, the same spirit. His
explanation of morality and ethics never of-
fers even a tiny space for religion and theol-
ogy. In Lewontin's framework of gene-or-
ganism-environment interaction, there is no
need for seeking anything transcendental.
What we have to do is back to our ordinari-
Religious morality hasfor a long time
emphasized the importance ofmoral self-
cultivation through learning and study
and the improvement ofmoralpropensity
through the bodily practice ofmorality.
ness to solve the prohlertis on the basis of the
existing established facts.
Here, the theologian cannot but ask: Does
biological science do a sufficient job in explain-
ing morality? Is this kind of biological expla-
nation of morality really new? Is it fair to say
that theology and philosophy have lost their
power to offer wisdom for humanity? From
the perspectives of theology and philosophy,
the thing that is "in the details" is actually the
devil, not God.-'' If science is to be taken seri-
ously, then the same seriousness ought to be
paid to religion, theology, and philosophy.
In this paper, the philosophical and reli-
gions explanations of morality that I take are
centered on ordinary human life. Philosophi-
cal explanation focuses on the bodily aspect
of human life, emphasizing creativity. Reli-
gious explanation mainly deals with the tran-
scendental, trying to figure out how the tran-
scendental intrudes into our ordinary life.
Both philosophical and religious explanations
are seen as two sides of the same coin.
Both the philosophical and the religious
explanations show that moral integrity is the
result of inborn tendencies combined with
learning.^° Indeed, for religion and philoso-
phy, religious morality has for a long time
emphasized the importance of moral self-cul-
tivation through learning and study and the
improvement of moral propensity through the
bodily practice of morality. Thus, for Confu-
cianism, morality has always been a matter of
knowing Tao ( £g ) and of practicing it by
accumulating Te ( f* moral energy to flow
out).
The moralistic interpretation of
wtiitetiead's ptiilosophy of organism
In Whitehead's philosophy of organism,
morality heavily depends on the feelings of
the subject-superject.^' In
the process of the subject-
superject, the actual entity
decides what it is itself "in
virtue of its feelings." ^^ It
is the decision of its future
relevance.^^ The selection
or decision of an actual en-
t. tity in term of its feelings is
understood by "our notion of moral responsi-
bihty." ^ The process as a selection is required
by "the depths of life." ^^
On the one hand, morality in life lies in
the facts that "life is robbery" and that "the
robber requires justification."^^ In this con-
text, life is "a characteristic of 'empty
space. '"^^ Thus, morality is a response to "a
certain social deficiency," which always ex-
ists between living beings.^^ On the other
hand, the fact of evil ultimately lies in the
fact that time is "a perpetual perishing." ^^ It
means that the process in time unavoidably
accompanies with selection. Thus, selection
is "at once the measure of evil, and the pro-
cess of its evasion." '*^ By this selection, the
actual entity completes its objectification.
Thus, the whole process of an actual entity
is the process of admission and elimination
for future relevance. In this sense, the deci-
sion of an actual entity is "a decision refer-
ent beyond itself," one anticipating its ob-
jective immortality."*' In this sense, morality
lies in a decision for future relevance, and it
is the process of passing on creativity. This
image of creativity offers the image of hu-
man beings as responsible decision-makers
and, thus, as a co-creators; and this image of
co-creator provides a very common motive
for developing an overall moral framework
in an age of biotechnology.'*- My religious
vision of human "betweenness" puts a ques-
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tion mark on this image of human beings as
co-creators.
For Whitehead, morality is basically a re-
sponse to biological and cultural past inherit-
ance. Nevertheless, the moral decision of an
actual occasion cooperates with the initial aim
from God's primordial nature. The transmu-
tation of causal efficacy into presentational
immediacy means this cooperation of the ac-
tual occasion with God's initial aim. From
this perspective, inborn ^,
tendency and learning
both belong to the cat-
egory of causal efficacy.
It is the cooperation with
the initial aim that
transmutates causal effi-
cacy into presentational
immediacy. In other
words, the concrescence
of an actual occasion is £<.
wider than that of open behavior program or
epigenetic rules. Nevertheless, it is not just a
"developmental noise" at the level of mol-
ecules, because the initial aim is guidance for
the actual occasion and because it comes from
the awareness of the whole cosmic process —
simply put, from God. In a sense, Lewontin
is right in that the interaction between genes
and environment does not completely explain
reality; but neither does the developmental
noise completely explain the concrescence of
the actual occasion.
Confucian interpretation of morality in
terms of human betweenness
Humans live in every unified eventuation
of "bodiliness" and "betweenness." Human
bodiliness roughly means that all human ac-
tivities are based on their bodies. Human ac-
tivity always seems to have its "oughtness",
whose origin is not clear for the present.'*^
Human activity is an intersected occasional
unification of the bodiliness and the
oughtness, and this unity consists of human
relations. If a certain behavior is detached
from its life situation, the question of the
oughtness never comes up. Conversely, be-
cause a person is always in life situation, he
or she cannot escape the question of
oughtness. This oughtness comes to us
through the betweeimess. There are you and
I. Between you and me, there is nothing if
we think we do not have any relationship.
However, even in this case, there is a rela-
tionship between us, because both of us are
human beings. Thus, between you and me,
there is the betweenness of human being,
which seems to require at least propriety for
the category of human being.''^ In most cases.
This image ofco-creator provides a very
common motivefor developing an overall
moralframework in an age ofbiotechnol-
ogy. My religious vision ofhuman ^^be-
tweenness^^ puts a question mark on this
image ofhuman beings as co-creators.
the betweeimess relation is mistakenly seen
as a singular or monolithic state between two
persons. However, human relations between
two people are more complex, because my
relation with you consists, for example, of the
between-professor-and-student relationship,
thebetween-White-middle-class-and-Yellow-
lower-class relationship, the between-Chris-
tian-sister-and-brother relationship, and so on.
Each relationship is termed "betweenness,"
because it describes the relational space-be-
tween-people. In this framework, relationality
or interpersonality is a very huge complex
consisting of many betweennesses that impose
the oughtness of each relation on the related
persons.
All the biologists mentioned in this paper
agree that genes, organism, and environment
are all interacting. The organism integrates the
biology of the body and culture by the open
behavior program or by epigenetic rules, or it
just functions as the "developmental noise"
on the level of molecules. Aconsensus among
these biologists is that morality is the com-
bined development of inborn tendencies and
learning. Even in Lewontin, the developmen-
tal noise, which produces organismal varia-
tions, is formed as neural connections during
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development. The formation of the connec-
tion may seem to be a random process from
the perspective of a determinist. but it is
formed by an inborn mechanism and its trans-
mutation of environmental signals into mo-
lecular signals. It does not preclude a possi-
bility that the environmental signals include
signals formed by learning. The contentions
between the biologists concern whether the
interaction can be regulated voluntarily by
human interventions and whether the inter-
ventions can be done in a predictive way.
The answers of Whitehead and Confu-
cianism are: microscopically, "No" to both
of the questions; but macroscopically, "Yes"
to both. The exact pathway of the transmu-
tation of causal efficacy into presentational
immediacy cannot be determined. Also, there
is no universal principle to integrate all the //
( IM betweenness[es]) within chi ( ^ bodi-
liness). Always, the integration of // and chi
into human mind is highly context-sensitive."*^
Nevertheless, the human mind can discern the
initial aim among its causal efficacy and pre-
sentational immediacy. The ability to discern
it or to have jen (t humanity) is very likely
an inborn mechanism called "moral sprout"
by Mencius.'^ It should be developed by
learning."^ Whether the interference of the
inborn moral tendency by learning can be ge-
netically stored and transmitted to the next
generation is totally a scientific question, but
at least on the level of culture, it is surely trans-
mitted."'^ It is the reason many of human so-
cieties have had an ideal of moral society.
Thus, Wilsonian vision of volitional evolu-
tion is at the discretion of later scientific dis-
coveries. However, his reasonless antagonism
against religion and his insistence of the re-
placement of religion with the evolutionary
epic are unfortunately very quick-tempered.
Here is my contention: Is the initial aim ex-
plained well by the biological explanations?
Even Wilson sees the role of the initial aim,
which is the divine (or sublime) vision of hu-
manity. The volitional evolution has been car-
ried out in terms of human vision of the Great
Whole.'*^ The evolutionary epic does not add
anything to this religious vision, nor can it
replace the vision as the guiding hand of hu-
man voluntary evolution.
A Religious and Philosophical
Response to Biological Morality
When morality is seen as "connected to
the genes responsible for the human essence,"
it is in fact "nothing but a self-serving for sur-
vival," because it is anyhow to increase the
fitness of an individual as a provenance of
auto-affection or a group as the extended iden-
tification of the "I" in terms of self-sameness.^
It may be a mere variation of hedonism, ac-
cording to which the ultimate desires are af-
ter all "the desires to obtain pleasure and avoid
pain." ^' Egoism leads the ultimate goals,
whether consciously or unconsciously, to a
"self-directed" one.^- However, we know that
we sometimes act altruistically, although we
are never absolutely and always altruistic.
What really matters here is how we can in-
crease the frequency of the operation of al-
truistic motives in our lives. How do we make
our motives other-directed? Although Wil-
son says that it is possible by knowing biol-
ogy, it is an ever-impossible project to make
people other-directed or altruistic by any ar-
tificial instrumental means. It is a matter of
self moral integrity through moral self-culti-
vation.^^ It is the matter of knowing the tran-
scendental amid the affairs of life— not the
transcendental into the other world, but that in-
to this world. How do we know it? Here lies
awe in front of mystery in our walking on the
Wayiil Tao).
Achieving self moral integrity is the mat-
ter of discerning the initial aim of God's pri-
mordial nature by an actual occasion within
the range of causal efficacy and presentational
immediacy. Eternal objects show God's mind,
although God's initial aim is always chang-
ing as we actual occasions are always chang-
ing. Although Lewontin thinks that it is im-
possible to make biology predictive, it is pos-
sible for us to get wisdom for the future in
the interaction between actual occasions,
causal efficacy, presentational immediacy,
and the initial aim. What we can get is not
predictive information but wisdom that is
shown to us as the initial aim. Achieving the
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self moral integrity also is the matter of get-
ting Te ( -f* virtue). Te is the integration of
the countless // ( Jf ) in the bodiliness ( 'M ),
and by doing so, it makes all the people ben-
eficial because Te flows naturally out of the
person and influences others, encouraging
them to follow Tao.
All of our motives are probably biologi-
cal, because inclusive fitness is the ultimate
goal of all the organisms. However, this in-
clusive fitness is maintained by secondary
behaviors— at least, in human cultures. In
human societies, reciprocal altruisin is more
prominent, as Mayr sees. It is not surprising
that almost all religions have emphasized the
coimnunality of human beings. Although
Confucianism expresses the reason for moral
integrity in the realm of the sublime, it never
sought for integrity itself. Without actualiz-
ing in ordinary, complex, human relationality,
anything called Tao is not Tao. Although
Wilson believes that religions and their sa-
cred mythologies can be replaced by "the epic
of evolution," the Sociobiology project just
shows how we can increase our fitness for the
future. It is Wilson's idea of volitional evolu-
tion and predictive science; that is, his vision
of volitional evolution involves the increase
of inclusive fitness as an extension of funda-
mentally egoistic motives, regardless of indi-
vidual or of group. However, the genuinely
altruistic motive emerges from a level differ-
ent from inclusive fitness, as Mayr mentions.
Nevertheless, theologians must take sci-
ence seriously.^ Theologians need to accept
that science literacy is very important.^^ In-
deed, methodological reductionism should not
be confused with metaphysics of reduction-
ism.* We theologians also analyze things.
The real truth, God, is beyond our determi-
nateness. God is the indeteraiinate.^^ Truth,
indeed, is unnamable. In order to see Truth,
we are analyzing it and reducing it in the form
of value. A simple (theological or philosophi-
cal) resistance against reductionism, whether
methodological or metaphysical, does not help
theologians to criticize science. A good criti-
cism should always recognize advantages and
disadvantages at the same time and be bal-
anced. In this sense, one needs to remember
that bodily self-cultivation includes study of
things. We need to be informed of science.
Without enough information and knowledge,
wisdom does not come to us. Thus. Chu Hsi
emphasized the importance of the investiga-
tion of things and the reflection on them.^
Also, we need to be sensitive to the con-
text. Tao does not exist without the common
affair. To keep concentrating on my personal
and ordinary matter will disclose the mind of
Tao. It does not end in my private enlighten-
ment because personality already abides in the
betweennesses. In this interconnected living,
we need to discern the "constant mean." ^ In
fact, in a society where a fact and its utility
are not clearly separated but rather intimately
connected, a mere statement of fact is "never
really a 'mere' statement of fact." ^ That is,
scientific truth is "not dependent on particu-
lar individuals," but rather "the criterion of
truth is a communal one. " ^' In this situation,
one clear possibility of preventing the misuse
of science for political ideology is "to keep
the public better informed." ^- The uncritical
close tie of our moral judgment to the latest
scientific knowledge will just reinforce our
unconscious (social or political) ideologies.^
In this sense, "a moral/political debate around
the potential implications of science may be
the only possible way to go." ^ It will make
science healthier.^^
Back to ordinary life
Moral integrity exists in our ordinary life,
neither only in our genes nor only in our en-
vironment, nor only on the level of mol-
ecules. Morality is the matter of the integra-
tion of all the level of life in ordinary life sim-
ations. It is the unification of Heaven, Earth,
and human mind in human ordinary life. All
the pathways of causal efficacy cooperate in
this unification. In ordinary life. Heaven's
mind is manifested in our betweenized pat-
tern of relations through our moral courage.
This can be seen as the creative unification of
God's creative act and human mind through
the Creator-created determination.^
Indeed, ordinary life is the scene of bioet-
hics.^'' Without referring to ordinary life, our
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oughtness seems to be groundless. This
oughtness arises when I look at the face of
the other. The relationship between my/self
and the other is betweenized, for example,
through the husband-wife pattern. What I
ought to do in this betweenness is very con-
text-sensitive. There is no universal principle
or norm for the action. However, I feel hu-
manity ( iZ ) in the betweermess. In this
ordinary life, moral integration is a very long
process, maybe a life-long one. We may fail.
Nevertheless, I wander amid wonder.^ This
awe in ordinary life cannot be reduced to mere
developmental noise.
Also, one needs bear in mind that human
hands are hidden behind all the activity of
human beings, including scientific activity.^
These hidden hands should be brought to vis-
ibility into ordinary life for all to see. They
should be visible to the eyes of others because
there is humanity abiding in the hands. The
unity of humanity and the hands is the ideal
of moral integrity ( ^'^Pfria — ). When
knowledge and action are united as human-
ity ( "fZ ) in human mind, everything is per-
mitted, because God (or Heaven and Earth)
is there. The locus of the transcendental God
is ordinary human life. The investigation of
things (study and learning) leads us closer to
God.
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